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Dutch “coffeeshops” are the world’s chief example of drug control via toleration (see 
Leuw, 1991; Leuw and Marshall, 1994; MacCoun, 2011; MacCoun and Reuter, 1997; Reinarman, 
Cohen, and Kaal, 2004; Wouters and Korf, 2009). In the Netherlands, it is de jure illegal to sell 
cannabis, but the national government and some municipalities condone its retail distribution 
by coffeeshops (NMHWS, 2003; NMFA, 2008). Yet, this business is not without risk. It is de jure 
and de facto illegal for them to procure the supply of cannabis for resale, which is punishable by 
a large fine or imprisonment (Trimbos Institute, 2010; Van der Gouwe, Ehrlich, and Van Laar, 
2009). They must obey a variety of regulations or be closed, for a short-term to permanently.  
Additionally, coffeeshops face the threat of victimization from violence, theft, fraud, and 
destruction (see Jacques, 2019; Jacques et al., 2016). In this article, we examine one way they 
respond to crimes against them: toleration (Black, 1998). We nest our study within the 
literature on social control by victimized drug dealers. After outlining key concepts and prior 
findings, we describe the foundational elements of the present study: contextualization within 
Dutch coffeeshop policy; the opportunity and rational choice perspectives; and, analysis of 
qualitative data obtained via interviews with personnel (owners and employees) of 50 
coffeeshops in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. From there, we show why and how coffeeshops 
tolerate victimization. We conclude with thoughts on how our findings are similar to, and 
different from, those in the literature on social control by drug dealers.  
Social Control 
At a broad level, this article contributes to the study of social control, also known as 
conflict management (Black, 1998; Cooney, 2009). Herein, this concept refers to social ways of 
handling wrongdoing. It varies qualitatively. Formal control is, by definition, exercised by 
governmental actors (Black, 1976). It includes arrest, prosecution, conviction, and punishment 
by imprisonment, execution, or other means (Cooney 2009). Informal control is the domain of 
non-governmental actors. They may shun offenders, demand compensation, or turn to self-
help (Black, 1998; Cooney, 2009). Self-help is a broad concept that includes everything from 
violent retaliation to the theft and destruction of wrongdoers’ property, to spreading gossip 
about them.  
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Social control varies quantitatively, too. For example, formal control is more severe 
when an offender is executed than imprisoned; convicted than acquitted; arrested than not. 
The same applies to forms of informal control. Retaliation is more severe than compensation, 
which is more severe than avoidance (Black, 1976, 1998; Cooney, 2009). Within those forms of 
control, responses are more severe when more injury is sustained, more compensation is paid, 
or avoidance lasts longer, and so forth.  
Toleration as Social Control 
This article’s narrower focus is toleration. Qualitatively, it is defined by the absence of 
the aforementioned forms of formal and informal control (Black, 1998; Cooney, 2009). To quote 
Black (1998: 98), “Toleration is inaction when a grievance might otherwise be handled. 
Although arguably not a form of conflict management at all, toleration is sometimes 
consciously advocated or adopted as the most effective response to deviant behavior, 
disagreement, or disruption.” Toleration is a quantitative variable, as well: 
A matter of degree, toleration is measurable by comparing what might otherwise occur 
under the same circumstances. When a group exacts blood vengeance for one killing but 
does little or nothing in response to another, its behavior in the latter is extremely 
tolerant. The same applies when a case of inaction might otherwise result in police 
intervention, arrest, or prosecution. We can also compare the degree of toleration 
across society and historical epochs. There is noticeable variation, for example, in 
reactions to drunkenness, adultery, homosexuality, and homicide. Nothing 
automatically attracts social control. (Black, 1998: 98-9) 
 
 Toleration is relevant to our understanding of both formal and informal control. It has 
theoretical importance for the very reason that when it occurs, other forms of control are 
absent. By explaining why toleration occurs, we expand knowledge about why other forms of 
conflict management do not occur (Jacques and Wright, 2008). This is only realized, however, 
when we conceptualize toleration as one of several forms of social control (as done above), and 
take strides to spell out the theoretical implications of toleration’s occurrence for the others. 
Opportunity and Rationality 
Social control broadly, and toleration in particular, are affected by opportunity and 
rationality. The opportunity perspective provides a foundational logic that opens and closes the 
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range of choices (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson and Clarke, 1998). The rationality perspective 
orients us to how actions’ utility, or benefits minus costs, affects the decision to enact one or 
another (Bentham, [1823] 1988; Cornish and Clarke 1986). 
To explain behavior, we must first determine what is possible. Opportunity varies. It also 
precedes decision-making. We look to see what can be done and, by extension, what choices 
are to be made. Every action hinges on the congruence of minimal elements (Cohen and Felson, 
1979; Cohen, Kluegel, and Land, 1981: 508-9; Felson and Clarke, 1998; Sparks, 1982: 29-30). 
Without one or more of those elements, the action is impossible. For example, if a victim 
cannot determine the offender’s identity, it is impossible to retaliate. This makes the rationality 
of that response a moot point; it is inconsequential because there is zero opportunity to act on 
it. Conversely, if the victim knows fthe offender’s identity, it is possible to retaliate. 
If a person is faced with two or more possible ways to act, they choose between them 
by weighing – consciously or subconsciously – their respective utility (Bentham, [1823] 1988; 
Cornish and Clarke 1986). Benefits and costs come in many forms, such as financial versus 
reputational. Other influences on decision-making may be in play, such as emotions or 
intoxication. For these reasons, rationality is said to be “bounded” (Cornish and Clarke 1986). 
Within those boundaries, people are assumed to act in ways that maximize utility. So, 
continuing with the above example, if it is possible for a victim to retaliate, they will decide 
whether to do so by assessing its benefits and costs versus alternative ways to manage the 
conflict.  
Opportunistic and Rational Social Control by Victimized Dealers 
 Traditionally, research on social control by illicit drug dealers – or “dealers” for short –
focuses on violent retaliation (e.g., Anderson, 1999; Jacobs and Wright, 2006; Jacques and 
Allen, 2015; Topalli, Wright, and Fornango, 2002). It has two necessary conditions: a victim and 
offender overlap in time and space; and, the victim must have the physical capacity (e.g., not be 
paralyzed) to be violent (Jacques, 2010). This response’s potential benefits are vengeance, 
resource recovery, and deterrence. The potential costs are being hurt or killed while retaliating 
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or subsequently in an act of counter-retaliation. There is a formal risk, too: because violent 
retaliation is a criminal act, it may result in arrest, prosecution, and punishment.  
 Often for dealers, the rationality of violent retaliation is attributed to the lack of 
opportunity for them to mobilize law. The basic premise is that because dealers are involved in 
crime, they lack access to formal means of redress, which, in effect, makes violent retaliation a 
relatively rational option (Goldstein 1985; Jacques et al., 2016). This is an extension of the 
Hobbes’ (1985 [1651]) classic theory that stateless societies have more violence (see also 
Cooney, 1998; Elias, 2000 [1939]; Weber, 1978 [1922]; for evidence, see Pinker, 2011).  
 In the literature, there is a subtle tension between whether dealers can mobilize law 
(i.e., a facet of opportunity) or choose not to do so (i.e., a rational decision). Some academic 
declarations proscribe the rule of law: “black market entrepreneurs cannot be ‘victims’ and 
therefore lack access to official means of grievance redress” (Jacobs, 2000: 1). Other statements 
leave the interpretation open to the reader: “The markets for illegal goods and services operate 
without the usual protections against fraud and violence offered by the court system” (Reuter 
2009: 275).  
 Fact is, any dealer can mobilize law. The opportunity exists, but its rationality varies 
across cases. Risks are that “snitching” lead to retaliation or brings the police’s attention to 
one’s crimes (Jacques and Wright, 2013; Natapoff, 2009). Yet dealers mobilize law, probably 
more than you would think (Copes et al., 2011: 159; Goldstein, 1985: 501; Mohamed and 
Fritsvold, 2009: 145; Moskos, 2008: 100; Rosenfeld, Jacobs, and Wright, 2003). This is because 
legal mobilization has the same potential benefits as violent retaliation: vengeance, resource 
recovery, and deterrence (Jacques and Wright, 2013; Jacques and Allen, 2015).  
Dealers also manage victimization with nonviolent forms of informal control (Jacques 
and Wright, 2008, 2011). Nonviolent retaliation is possible and practical to the extent that a 
victim can get near an offender’s property and damage or steal it (Jacques, 2010). Another form 
of self-help, gossip, allows victims to get even by discrediting offenders, plus may help fellow 
dealers from being victimized the same way (Dickinson and Wright, 2015). Negotiation provides 
a means for reaching compensation and continuing a profitable business relationship, but 
requires the offenders’ cooperation and, thus, may open the door to repeat victimization 
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(Hoffer, 2006; Venkatesh, 2008). And avoidance, by limiting further interaction with the 
offender, protects against further victimization, but may come at the cost of lost sales (Denton, 
2001; Taylor, 2007).  
Opportunistic and Rational Toleration by Victimized Dealers 
To our knowledge, toleration has not been the principle focus of any study on social 
control by dealers. What is known about dealers’ toleration of victimization is piecemeal; a 
digression, or logical beginning or endpoint of examinations into the others forms of conflict 
management, typically violent retaliation (e.g., Coomber and Maher, 2006; Jacobs, 2000; Jacobs 
and Wright, 2006; Jacques and Wright, 2008, 2015; Moeller and Sandberg, 2017; Taylor, 2007). 
Nonetheless, those findings provide a useful starting point for informing dealers’ toleration of 
victimization.  
For example, Jacobs (1999) attends to the lack of violent retaliation among street-level 
dealers. In the following excerpt, note the importance of opportunity and costs in the decision 
to forgo retaliation:  
[T]he extent to which sellers could or did seek revenge was limited. Tracking down petty 
brigands not only is difficult, but it takes time, foresight, and planning—qualities few 
offenders can muster. Given their desperation for customers, the availability of the 
same undifferentiated product in nearby locales, and the general state of stagnating 
demand, a certain sense of ambivalence seemed to prevail about punishing customers 
they did track down. (p. 80) 
 
A separate study of street dealers, namely that of Topalli, Wright, and Fornango (2002), focuses 
more so on the rationality of toleration: 
A number of drug dealer/victims indicated that, in the absence of direct retaliation, the 
only way to recover from a robbery was simply to go back out and resume selling. … 
These individuals not only were unwilling to suffer the potentially serious consequences 
of retaliating (i.e. counter-retaliation or arrest and incarceration), they also considered 
retaliation an inefficient use of time better spent hustling. … Typically, this meant 
accepting robbery [victimization] as a normal cost of street-corner drug selling. … [Or 
they] justified their unwillingness to engage in retaliation as sound fiscal policy. Smirk, 
for example, claimed that he could easily have retaliated against the assailants, but 
chose not to because “that shit’s bad for business.” (p. 346-8) 
 
Those ideas are echoed in Jacques and Wright’s (2011) research on conflict management by 
lower-class and middle-class dealers: 
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Toleration is valuable to disputants because it maintains the status quo. Toleration takes 
no time or effort, nor is it illegal. Therefore, disputants may prefer to do nothing rather 
than exercise more costly forms of informal control. Tolerating a grievance may allow for 
the reparation of formerly beneficial partnerships and thereby facilitate drug trade. … 
Drug traders will sometimes refrain from retaliation and other forms of popular justice 
for fear of subsequent retaliation, which may entail the cost of injury or theft. (p. 754-5) 
 
In short, there is always the opportunity for toleration. An advantage (not a benefit per 
se) of toleration is it takes no time or effort (i.e., costs nothing in those regards), thereby 
making way for more beneficial actions (e.g., continuing to sell) (Jacobs, 1999). Unlike 
mobilizing police or retaliating, toleration does not risk bringing attention to one’s illegal 
activities or escalating the conflict (Jacques and Wright, 2015; Topalli, Wright, and Fornango, 
2002). On the other hand, toleration has no deterrent or retributive effect. It does not provide a 
direct way to recover lost resources. Yet like negotiation and unlike avoidance, toleration helps 
to keep a profitable relationship going (Jacques and Wright, 2011).  
The Present Study 
Quasi-Illegal Coffeeshops 
Not all dealers are engaged in a business that is fully illegal. “Quasi-illegal” or “semi-
illegal” dealers are on the rise. In the United States, federal law prohibits cannabis distribution, 
yet some states have reduced criminal sanctions or even legalized retail sales. Other nations 
have decriminalized cannabis sales, including Switzerland (Killias et al., 2011), Portugal (Félix 
and Portugal, 2017), England and Wales (Brewster, 2017), Norway (Bretteville-Jensen and 
Bramness, 2019), and Denmark (Moeller, 2020). The Netherlands is the oldest and most famous 
example (Kleiman, Caulkins and Hawken, 2011).  
Despite the influx of quasi-illegal dealers to the worldwide drug scene, research remains 
predominantly focused on how fully-illegal dealers respond to victimization. Largely unknown is 
whether and why these groups differ in conflict management. To address that lacuna, the 
present study examines toleration of victimization by coffeeshops in Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands. Their purchase of cannabis supplies is de jure and de facto illegal. Also, their retail-
level sales are de jure illegal, yet formally tolerated under certain conditions: They are 
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prohibited from distributing more than 5 grams per day to an adult (i.e., person who is 18 years 
of age or older) (NMFA, 2008; NMHWS, 2003). The rules also prohibit minors, hard drugs, or 
more than 500 grams of cannabis on the premises. Nor can coffeeshops advertise or be a 
source of a nuisance.  
The rules are actively enforced and dictate much of the day-to-day activities within 
coffeeshops (Jacques, 2019). The government looks for violations, among other ways, by 
requiring the police to randomly search each coffeeshop twice annually, at least (Trimbos 
Institute, 2010). Violations are punishable by short-term to permanent closure. Criminal 
prosecution is on the table. At the time of data collection, described below, the maximum 
penalty for possession, cultivation, sale, transport, and production of cannabis for commercial 
purposes was 6 years imprisonment and/or a fine of €67,000 (NMFA, 2008). 
Social Control by Victimized Coffeeshops 
Like any actor, coffeeshops can respond formally or informally to victimization. They 
mobilize law, retaliate against or gossip on, negotiate with, or “cut-off” the offender. Or, they 
do nothing; that is, tolerate the offense. Prior research on social control by victimized 
coffeeshops is sparse. Only two works, to our knowledge, focus on social control by victimized 
coffeeshops. We will directly build on them in the present study.  
Jacques and colleagues (2016) compared how coffeeshops to bars and street dealers. 
Bars sell a drug (alcohol) that is fully legal, whereas street dealers sell various drugs (e.g., 
cocaine, heroin, ecstasy) that are fully prohibited. A goal of their study was to determine if the 
illegality of a victim’s businesses affected their likelihood of responding formally or informally. 
They found mixed support for that hypothesis: Coffeeshops responded similarly to bars, which 
were more likely than street dealers to mobilize police, less likely to violently retaliate, and less 
likely to tolerate. That article left much unexamined and unexplained. Its limitations include no 
qualitative analysis of why coffeeshop personnel responded to victimization in a particular way.  
In a prior article, we began to address the above study’s limitations by exploring 
coffeeshops’ qualitative reasons for mobilizing police in response to victimization (Authors 
XXXX). Personnel weighed whether police officers would be willing and able to help; two, and 
relatedly, the crime’s seriousness and its conduciveness to formal investigation; three, if a 
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written police report could be used to “write-off” the loss in tax filings or to make an insurance 
claim; and, four, whether mobilization would lead the police to see the coffeeshop as less 
respectable or to discover a rule violation. Those findings show that due to their quasi-illegal 
status, victimized coffeeshops’ motivations for formal control are somewhat, on the one hand, 
like those of fully-illegal dealers (e.g., the fourth motive) and, on the other hand, like those of 
fully-legal ones (e.g., the third motive), as well as that some motivations (e.g., the first and 
second) cut across the spectrum of legal statuses. 
Our prior study has logical implications for explaining toleration, given its inverse 
relationship with police mobilization. Therein, personnel’s explanations for mobilizing police 
amount to explanations for not tolerating, and vice versa. A good example is Hassan’s toleration 
of a €400 theft from the register. He did not call the police because “[the thief] was gone. If you 
call them they are going to see the camera and that’s it. They are not going to do shit, believe 
me. It’s going to get reported, that’s the only thing [that will result]. It’s only giving me extra 
work, extra headache for nothing” (Authors XXXX: 5). The crime was relatively serious, but he 
figured the police would be unwilling or unable to do much about it, owing to the difficultly of 
investigating, and he was unaware that a written police report had tax or insurance benefits. 
Ergo, Hassan perceived the costs of mobilizing police as outweighed by its potential benefits, 
making toleration the more attractive option.  
Data and Methods 
Whereas our prior article analyzed coffeeshop personnel’s reasons for mobilizing police, 
the present study focuses on their reasons for tolerating victimization. It is based on qualitative 
data collected by [name of coauthor], here forward referred to as “the fieldworker,” during 
interviews with personnel of 50 coffeeshops in and around Amsterdam’s Red Light District. The 
area is about one square mile in size, and a popular tourism spot because of its history, 
architecture, and, not least, deviant attractions – including coffeeshops.  
An initial step in the research was to create a population list of coffeeshops in the study 
locale. To do so, the fieldworker walked every street segment in fall 2008, recording the names 
and addresses of every coffeeshop. He verified the list’s accuracy and completeness by 
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comparing it to results on Google Maps and the Amsterdam Coffee Shop Directory 
(coffeeshop.freeuk.com/Map.html). The result of that process was a list of 84 coffeeshops. 
The fieldworker conducted interviews and made observations from September 2008 to 
May 2010, with follow-up visits in the summers of 2011 and 2016. The present study focuses on 
the interview data, as our focus is on personnel’s explanations for tolerating victimization. 
Before recruiting personnel of a coffeeshop, he mailed it a letter. It described the study and 
requested participation, with one side of the page written in Dutch, the other English. Then he 
visited each coffeeshop to ask for an interview. On arrival, he introduced himself, provided his 
business card, and quickly described the study’s purpose and methods, including that 
respondents would be remunerated with €50. The stated preference was to interview higher- 
than lower-ranking personnel, but, at a minimum, the person must have owned or worked at 
the coffeeshop for 6 months or more.  
The interviewed personnel are 64% male, with an average age of 34, of whom 70% 
identified as White, 6% Black, and 24% other. Also, 40% immigrated to the Netherlands; 10% 
were married; 26% graduated from secondary school; and, 56% and 30% reported, respectively, 
daily use of cannabis and alcohol. Participants also provided data on the traits of fellow-
personnel at their coffeeshop. On average, 67% are male, 81% White, 47% immigrants, and 
15% married. At the average coffeeshop, there is one owner, one manager, five “dealers” who 
focus on cannabis sales but may also serve food and drink, two “servers” who focus on food 
and drink, a “runner” who is responsible for stocking cannabis, and perhaps one other person 
(e.g., dedicated cleaner or doorman). 
The goal of interview was to obtain data about coffeeshops’ prevention of, experience 
with, and responses to victimization. A semi-structured interview protocol provided consistency 
in coverage while permitted unplanned follow-up questions. Naturally, some participants may 
have distorted the “truth,” intentionally or not (Presser and Sandberg 2015; Bernasco 2010). To 
address this concern, the fieldworker asked clarifying, promised confidentiality, and made 
participants aware of their rights as a research participant. The study was approved by the 
fieldworkers’ Institutional Review Board. Conversations were in English because the fieldworker 
is only fluent in it, but this did not stop anyone from participating. All recruited personnel were 
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fluent in English, the most commonly spoken language in the study area’s coffeeshops and 
other tourist attractions.  
Interviews lasted an hour to two, were audio-recorded, and transcribed verbatim. Eight 
of the 50 interviews could not be transcribed, as 7 personnel declined to be recorded and 
another interview took place in a loud environment. The fieldworker took detailed notes during 
those interviews. For analysis, we used a qualitative software package, NVivo. First, files were 
coded with identification tags corresponding to relevant research issues. The tags were initially 
broad, such as “Social Control” and then, within that node, “Toleration.” Subsequently, we 
sifted through the data to create narrower distinctions. The emergent categories were how and 
why personnel tolerated victimization. Our final step was detailed analysis of variance across 
cases, which led to our findings, presented below.  
Toleration by Victimized Coffeeshops 
Opportunity and Toleration 
As to be expected, personnel commonly tolerated property crimes of low seriousness. 
An example is graffiti on the exterior of coffeeshops. Unanimously, coffeeshops did nothing 
about these offenses, other than cover them up. “We paint over it,” to quote James. Responses 
in the same vein were “painted it” (Gwen), “just try to clean it a little bit” (Mike), “the clearer 
repaints it” (Jens), “[the maintenance man] has to clean that shit” (Victor), and “we have a 
service that I can call and they come to clean it” (Anna). Max put it this way: “You just get it off 
and don’t worry about it. I think that’s the way to do business.” 
Graffiti was a more common problem inside coffeeshops. Patrons would add words and 
images to tables, seats, and other places by carving them out or penning them on. Lizzie 
described how she responded to writing on a table, which was made with a large black marker: 
“I tried to clean it, but you can’t always get it all off so you have to wait [until someone can 
come to fix it professionally]. I think the tables are covered in some sort of epoxy. You have to 
pay someone to do it. That takes time. You have to buy the epoxy and sanding stuff.” 
Vandalism was most rampant in bathrooms, presumably due to the lack of surveillance 
therein. When personnel were asked how they handled bathroom vandalism, their typical 
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responses amounted to “nothing” (Jasper). At most, coffeeshops would semi-regularly “paint it 
over” (Hassan). Referring to “Cosa Nostra” in big letters on the bathroom wall, Gwen said the 
“cleaner cleaned it.” Dean explained that for graffiti in his coffeeshop’s bathroom, the stall (i.e. 
partition) “is metal, [so] you have to use special stuff to clean it.” 
Another common, minor crime in coffeeshops was the unseen theft of low value items. 
Especially for small things, it is challenging for personnel to keep an eye on, and thereby stop, 
them from going missing. Moreover, it is difficult to quickly identify when and with who they 
have gone. The theft of low value items are ripe for toleration, especially when coupled with 
restraints on surveillance. A case in point is how personnel become cognizant of, and 
responded to, stolen “grinders.” These tools are about the size of macarons, and used to cut 
marijuana into smaller pieces suitable for rolling into a joint or packing into a pipe. Olivia 
observed: “It is always afterwards [they are gone] that I think, ‘Oh shit, someone has taken the 
grinder.’” Stefan explained: “You never notice [immediately] that [they are stolen] because you 
lend them out and then forgot or whatever, and then you’re like ‘Oh, the grinder’s gone.’ You 
always realize it later, of course.” 
In Luca’s coffeeshop were miniature, swing-top, metal trashcans. Their purpose was to 
keep the place tidy, but they were attractive targets to some thieves. Asked how they handled 
these victimizations, he stated: “We don’t see it happen, so we have to tolerate it. If I see them 
I would tell them [not to], but I never see them. [We] just buy a new one.” Elias’ responded 
likewise after potted plants were stolen from the patio: “We just bought new ones.” 
Vandalism and minor thefts were as common as they were tolerated. Yet this inaction to 
victimization is not fully explained by the crime’s seriousness. Rather, a factor that increased 
the crimes’ frequency – a lack of surveillance – also explains why they were tolerated. Of any 
place in coffeeshops, for example, the least watched were bathrooms. Rules of comportment 
dictated it was open the opportunity for vandalism therein than apply panoptic principles to 
lavatories. By extension, bathroom vandalism was only discovered after the fact.  
Without identifying a victimizer, it is impossible for victims to respond with retaliation, 
negotiation, or avoidance. At the heart of rational choice is weighing the utility of options. Yet if 
there is only one option, its utility is inconsequential. This was often conveyed by personnel 
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when explaining their responses to graffiti and minor theft: “There is nothing I can do about it 
[graffiti carved into table]. No idea who it was” (Gwen); “By the time we realize [the glasses are 
stolen], they have gone” (Joseph); “You can’t do anything about it [stolen ashtrays]” (Ruben). 
 
Rationality and Toleration 
However, in the above cases, toleration is not the only option for social control. In any 
circumstance, victimized coffeeshops can call the police to report a problem. Thus, what 
explains toleration is not a total lack of alternatives. It does not appear that the personnel gave 
any real thought to handling those crimes by involving the police. They spoke about tolerating 
them in a way that reflects Geertz’s (1983) notion of common sense. Personnel assumed that 
police would be unwilling and unable to help; saw the crimes as minor and unconducive to 
investigation; and, did not consider them worth “writing-off” in tax filings or worthy of an 
insurance claim (see Authors, XXXX). Also, it was possible that by involving the police in a 
problem, personnel would do damage to their coffeeshop’s reputation or inadvertently bring 
attention to a rule violation (ibid.). Thus, personnel responded to the above victimizations by, at 
most, proverbially or literally painting over the problem. 
Toleration does occur in more serious circumstances. Rationally speaking, this can be 
advantageous by allowing business to carry on, preventing a conflict from escalating. An 
example is how personnel responded to customers who attempted to pay with counterfeit bills. 
Though legally required to confiscate fakes and make a police report, personnel sometimes 
took a more passive approach. “I don’t accept the money,” said Kamila, “I return the money to 
the customer and ask for some different one [bill].” The fieldworker asked her, “And so this is 
never reported to the police or anything, you just give them the bill back and ask them to go?” 
She responded, “Yes, because it is not my problem at this moment.” 
Also evident in the above case is that victims tolerate offenses by known offenders. 
Linda recounted when an employee stole €150 on his last day at work. Asked how the 
coffeeshop’s manager handled it, she answered, “Except for being pissed, I don’t think much.” 
Emma fell victim to a thief who ran off with a bag of marijuana. She could have chased after, 
but explained: “I am not going to run after somebody for a bag of weed, no way.” After 
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someone suddenly sprinted away with a bag of marijuana before paying, Hanna’s reaction was, 
“‘What’ [just happened?]’ And then I ran after him but he ran away [too far] already. Outside 
the door [is how far I got], not far.” Jana was working one day when someone paid with half of 
a €5 bill, literally: “I picked it up and he was already gone. I was like, ‘Hey!’ and there was a big 
group [of customers that] just walked in so I could not [leave]. When I got out of the door he 
was already at the end [of the block], and I did not want to leave my shop alone.” 
The utility of toleration for moving on, versus making things worse, is seen in 
personnel’s responses to violent victimization. James had an ongoing problem with a homeless 
individual. One of the recent cases was an attempted assault. A glass bottle had been thrown at 
him, with the intention of causing bodily harm. Instead of respond in kind, James had come to 
believe that the best response was to do nothing:  
Nothing, because over the years it has caused me more aggravation getting wound up 
over him.  You can say, “I have had enough of this”, and try to do something about it but 
he has 24 hours being insane and taking all his vengeance on the world out on one 
person and he has a lot more effort to put into having fights. So yeah, I just really try to 
ignore it as much as possible because it really drains me of energy. You have to turn the 
other cheek. So I just decided to leave it. It is easier to just ignore it than get involved in 
it, because it just escalates and escalates.  
 
Another example of tolerating violence was narrated by Selma. The story began when 
“two or three kilos” of cannabis were robbed from the coffeeshop owners. Asked about how 
they handled the situation, she responded: “I think nothing. I don’t think they went after them, 
no.” Asked if she knows why not, she said, “I think it was impossible because they were 
Romanian, and they come here with a car from Romania to buy this stuff to go back, and you 
can never find them again. How would you find them? I think it is impossible.” It may have been 
impossible to find the robbers, but this did not make toleration the only option. The owners 
could have reported the crime to the police. We did not interview the owners, so we do not 
know their motives. Yet it is easy to imagine that they did not want to involve “the law” in a 
victimization that sprang from a fully-illegal drug deal gone wrong.   
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Discussion 
Victimization is an ever-present risk for coffeeshops. They lose money when robbed, 
stolen from, or defrauded. They spend money to repair the damage of vandalism. Personnel 
can respond formally or informally. This article examined personnel’s toleration of crimes 
against their coffeeshops. We did so by analyzing qualitative data obtained during interviews 
with personnel of 50 coffeeshops in Amsterdam. Our focus was on the effect of opportunity 
and rational factors. Now, in this section, we specify how our findings are similar to, and 
different from, those in the literature on social control by dealers. In doing so, we explicate how 
coffeeshops’ quasi-illegal status affected their toleration, the theoretical implications, and 
considerations for future research.  
First, we found that personnel were apt to tolerate minor victimizations, such as graffiti 
and the theft of low value items. A lack of surveillance helps to explain this non-response. 
Often, by the time victims had realized they were victimized, the perpetrators were gone and 
their identities unknown. At that point, personnel had no opportunity to retaliate, seek 
compensation, or ban the offenders. This left two options for social control: mobilize law or do 
nothing. In line with findings in or prior article (Authors, XXXX), personnel deemed it irrational 
to mobilize police for those crimes. Toleration prevailed. Theoretically, the implication is that 
victims’ knowledge of offenders’ identity varies inversely with toleration (i.e., as the former 
increases, the latter decreases) and, conversely, directly with active forms of social control – 
legal mobilization, self-help, negotiation, and avoidance.  
Personnel could have done more to expand the options for social control (i.e., increase 
the range of alternatives). As a reactive measure, for example, personnel could have regularly 
inspected bathrooms for fresh marks. If found, personnel could then retaliate or, more likely, 
demand compensation from the culprit or remove them. In a world without limits, that would 
make more sense. Yet there are rational limits on investigation, and it may be more rational to 
act in other ways, as explained below. 
Our second finding shows that toleration is not wholly attributable to seriousness or 
limited options for social control. Toleration has no direct benefits or direct costs. Its rationality 
stems from costing less than alternatives. It involves nothing and, therefore, takes no time and 
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effort. This has two advantages: it frees time and effort to be expended on more important 
activities, such as selling cannabis; and, it does not escalate a conflict and risk making a problem 
bigger. In our data, this was evident in minor crimes and serious victimizations (Authors XXXX). 
To an extent, victimization was accepted as a cost of business. Theoretically, the implication is 
that the profitability of freed time and effort varies directly with toleration (i.e., as the former 
increases, the latter increases) and, in the opposite direction, inversely with active forms of 
social control.  
Those findings are evident in prior research on fully-illegal dealers (Jacobs, 1999; 
Jacques and Wright, 2011, 2015; Topalli, Wright, and Fornango, 2002). So far as we can tell, 
fully-illegal and quasi-illegal dealers have the same motivations for toleration. Presumably, 
those motivations are not unique to those groups, but also apply to sellers of fully legally 
substances (e.g., bars, liquor stores) and actors more broadly. A distinct matter is whether drug 
sellers of differing legalities use toleration at the same rate. Consider, for instance, cases in 
which it is impossible or impractical to identity and track-down offenders, leaving victims with 
the choice between toleration and legal mobilization. In theory, it is riskiest for fully-illegal 
dealers to call the police and, thus, they should be more likely to tolerate victimizations than, 
say, coffeeshops. Only one quantitative study has addressed that possibility, which found 
support for the idea (Jacques et al., 2016). Yet, by the same reasoning, coffeeshops should be 
more likely to tolerate victimizations than are bars, which was not evident in that study’s data. 
At least in the Dutch context, coffeeshops’ responses to victimization appear more like those of 
bars than street dealers (ibid.). In and outside Amsterdam and the Netherlands, more 
quantitative research is needed on the rates at which dealers of differing legal statuses – fully-
illegal, quasi-illegal, and fully legal – respond to victimization in various ways.  
A third finding concerns how coffeeshops tolerate victimization: social inaction coupled, 
sometimes, with repair or replacement of damaged or stolen goods. Prior literature discusses the 
replacement of stolen money and drugs (Jacobs, 1999; Topalli, Wright, and Fornango, 2002), but 
not, to our knowledge, other items. In coffeeshops, however, toleration of a victimization was 
often combined with “paint[ing] over it” (James), “clean[ing] it a little bit” (Mike), or otherwise 
“get[ting] it off” (Max). And when something of necessity is stolen from coffeeshops (e.g., 
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trashcans, ashtrays, glasses), they “bought new ones” (Elias). Possibly, the literature’s lack of 
attention to repair and replacement is attributable to the prior focus on fully-illegal dealers.  
We state our logic as a series of theoretical statements to test, expand, or refine in future 
research: (1) As dealers’ business becomes more legal (e.g., changes from fully- to quasi-illegal), 
they are more likely to sell out of a public, physical store that they rent or own. This is rational to 
the extent it increases the opportunity for potential customers to become aware of, visit, and 
purchase from sellers, without the risk of legal trouble. (2) Dealers who sell from such a locale 
are more likely to be the victim of vandalism and theft – specifically of non-drug, non-cash items 
– perpetrated by an unidentified offender. This assumes that by selling in a public, physical store, 
there is more opportunity for dealers to interact with unknown persons; unknown persons are 
more likely to commit offenses (Cooney, 2006; Jacques and Wright, 2015); and, there is more 
opportunity to vandalize and steal such items in a public, physical store. (3) Vandalism and minor 
theft – specifically of non-drug, non-cash items – are more likely to be handled with repair or 
replacement than other victimizations. We are least confident in the validity of that assertion. 
Regarding theft, it is rational to replace low value items because there is little cost in doing so, 
but, for that very reason, it may not be imperative to replace them. However, if we hold constant 
an item’s functional importance, it makes sense that it is more likely to be replaced, more quickly, 
if it costs less. The rationality of repairing property damage is more complex. If someone breaks 
an exterior window, there is good reason to immediately repair it; not doing so risks further 
victimization, among other problems. Conversely, writing on a bathroom wall is less imperative 
to fix. Yet by not addressing the problem sooner than later, the problem may be worsened.  
In the criminological literature, the body of work mostly closely associated with repair and 
prevention is that on order-maintenance, or “broken windows,” policing (Kelling and Wilson, 
1982; Kelling and Coles, 1997). The theory is that in any given place (e.g., unique address, street 
block or neighborhood), onlookers perceive its physical disorder as inversely related to its 
control; thus, offenders’ see the place as a less risky place to offend; and, therefore, more crime 
occurs there. In other words, a clean, unblemished environment serves as a deterrent. The 
practical implication is that to reduce crime at a place, its physical disorder should be minimized. 
That effect was not Jack’s motivation for cleaning bathroom vandalism, but it become apparent:  
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The toilet gets tagged [graffiti on it] a bit. We let it build up and I decorated it three 
months ago, and it hasn’t happened since. That was the first time I decorated it in a 
couple of years and it was fairly heavily covered in stickers and tags and shit like that. 
Since I decorated, I think there has been one put up, so say once in three months. It was 
covered; it was hard to tell the timescale of it with something happening every week 
probably [in the preceding nine months]. 
 
This finding suggests that future research should explore how dealers’ (non-)repair of vandalism, 
and plausibly their (non-)replacement of stolen items, affects their future odds of victimization.  
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